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WHAT IS WRONG WITH SEX IN 
AUTHORITY RELATIONS? A STUDY  
IN LAW AND SOCIAL THEORY 
GALIA SCHNEEBAUM* 
Criminalization of Sex within Authority Relations (SAR)—such as sex 
in the relationship between a therapist and a patient or an employer and an 
employee—is a growing phenomenon. Current theories conceptualize and 
consequently justify SAR offenses either under a liberal conception of 
sexual autonomy or under a feminist conception of gender inequality. Yet 
both conceptualizations are inadequate and fail to capture the 
distinctiveness of this new legal category. Specifically, they fail to explain 
the main puzzle underlying SAR offenses, which proscribe sexual contact in 
the absence of coercion by the offender. Rejecting both liberal and feminist 
analytical frameworks, this Article draws on Max Weber’s theory of 
authority to suggest that SAR offenders engage in a novel type of abuse of 
authority. This abuse involves the overstepping of bureaucratic power into 
personal relationships and specifically the use of charisma of the office in 
sexual relations. This new conceptualization calls for a reconsideration of 
SAR criminalization as sex offenses and paves the way for an alternative 
regulation based on the notion of abuse of office, which is fundamentally 
understood as anticorruption regulation. 
 
* Assistant Professor, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Radzyner Law School. I 
am grateful to Shai Lavi for invaluable comments and suggestions. I thank Avinoam Cohen, 
Hanoch Dagan, Miri Gur-Arie, Alon Harel, Shelly Kreiczer-Levi, Roy Kreitner, Amit 
Pundik, Anat Rosenberg, and Yofi Tirosh for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this 
essay. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Consider the cases of a psychologist who pressures his patient into 
sexual intercourse; a boss who makes persistent sexual propositions to his 
subordinate until she caves in; and a university professor who persuades his 
reluctant research student into having sex. In all of these cases, there is a 
clear sense of wrong. Less clear is an understanding of the nature of the 
wrong, since neither extortion, fraud, nor any other traditional form of 
nonconsent under criminal law is involved. This Article offers a new theory 
to explain such cases. 
Criminalization of sexual contact in relationships between a person of 
authority and a person under his authority is a contemporary trend in many 
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legal systems, including the United States, Israel,1 Great Britain,2 and 
Canada.3 These offenses, which I refer to as Sex in Authority Relations 
(SAR) offenses, share a common element: they all proscribe sexual contact 
within a certain type of social relationship in which one side holds a 
position of power over the other. Notwithstanding this imbalance of power, 
SAR offenses do not require an element of force and prohibit seemingly 
consensual sexual relations. To be sure, certain SAR cases involve coercive 
threats by the authority figure—for example, a workplace supervisor who 
threatens to fire an employee if she refuses his sexual advances4 or a high 
school principal who threatens to block a student’s graduation if she fails to 
meet his sexual demands.5 Other cases involve fraud—for example, a 
mental health therapist who falsely represents intercourse as part of 
therapy.6 In all of these cases, traditional criminal law doctrines could view 
the sex as nonconsensual.7 In many SAR cases, however, physical 
aggression is absent and the offender does not make coercive threats or 
represent fraudulent claims. Moreover, many SAR provisions disregard the 
question of victim consent or even specify that consent is not a defense.8 
Thus, two important questions arise: If sex between a workplace 
supervisor and an employee or between a therapist and patient is consensual 
(or not nonconsensual), on what grounds are these cases criminalized?9 
Additionally, what justifies the prohibition, backed by severe criminal 
 
1 American law and Israeli law are extensively addressed in this Article. See infra notes 
21–71 and accompanying text. 
2 Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 16–24 (U.K.). 
3 Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, § 273(2)(c). 
4 See, e.g., Jin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 310 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2002). 
5 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990).  
6 See, e.g., Shapiro v. State, 696 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1997); CrimA 
7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel 49(1) PD 1 [1995] (Isr.).  
7 Criminal law traditionally recognized several categories for the invalidation of 
consent—namely, cases where the victim’s outward signaling of consent was not considered 
a valid consent by criminal law. These are: incapacity, coercion through threats (extortion), 
and deception. For discussion of these categories, see 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS 
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 189–343 (1986).  
8 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. §12.1-20-06.1 (2012) (“Any person who is or who holds 
oneself out to be a therapist and who intentionally has sexual contact, as defined in section 
12.1-20-02, with a patient or client during any treatment, consultation, interview, or 
examination is guilty of a class C felony. Consent by the complainant is not a defense under 
this section.”). 
9 The conceptual question addressed in this Article should be distinguished from another 
question which I do not discuss here—the mens rea of the offender in SAR cases. I do not 
consider mens rea issues but rather discuss a more basic and preliminary question, which 
concerns the actus reus and the wrongfulness in SAR offenses.  
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punishment, of a consensual sexual affair between mature10 and competent 
partners? These are the fundamental questions hovering in the background 
of any contemporary analysis of SAR offenses and are the main questions 
pursued in this Article.11 
At present, SAR laws fall within the jurisdiction of penal regulations—
i.e., criminal offenses or wrongs. While the language of the legislation is 
clearly criminal, legal theory lacks a fitting explanation and a proper 
justification for SAR offenses. Existing scholarship and jurisprudence 
recognize the misfit between SAR and customary categories of 
nonconsent.12 One common response, inspired by liberal thought, has been 
to cling to the language of nonconsent, using “coerced” consent when 
coercive measures were not used,13 or “technical”14 or ungenuine15 consent 
when consent was nominally present. Another response, inspired by 
feminist thought, abandons the question of consent and describes SAR in 
terms of gender exploitation and abuse of power.16 
This Article suggests that neither the liberal nor the feminist theory is 
best suited to explain SAR offenses, and that neither the language of 
 
10 My analysis focuses on SAR offenses relating to mature victims. Cases involving 
minor victims deserve separate consideration and offenses against underage victims are 
therefore outside the scope of this Article. 
11 This Article is dedicated to the narrower but nevertheless prevalent set of cases that do 
not involve threats or fraud. These cases best exemplify the theoretical challenge underlying 
SAR. In Part III, I will return to SAR offenses that do involve extortion and fraud, and draw 
some broader normative implications that apply to SAR offenses in general. 
12 See infra notes 101, 109–112, and accompanying text. 
13 See, e.g., Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 
39, 79–84, 101–107 (1998). 
14 CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) IsrSC PD 172, 184 [2005] (Isr.). 
The Israeli Supreme Court held that “even if consent was given,” “criminal law, by taking 
into account the inferior position of the victim and the imbalance of power between the 
parties, treats this consent as merely technical, rather than legally effective.” Id. at 183. This 
translation to English and all subsequent extracts from Israeli court decisions is the author’s, 
unless otherwise stated.  
15 CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 60(1) PD 257, 268 [2005] (Isr.), translated 
in CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376, 390 [2005] (Isr.). In interpreting 
the offense of SAR in employment, the Israeli Supreme Court held that  
[The relevant provisions] concern a situation in which consent was apparently given by the 
worker to the sexual acts that were committed against him or her. Notwithstanding, the aforesaid 
consent was obtained in circumstances in which the supervisor abused his position of authority. 
These circumstances give rise to a suspicion, which is based on life experience and common 
sense, that notwithstanding the fact that the sexual acts were apparently committed with consent, 
this was not a freely given and genuine consent. 
Id. at 391. 
16 See discussion of feminist conceptualizations of SAR, infra Part I.B. 
2. SCHNEEBAUM (FINAL TO PRINTER)7/19/2016 
2015] SEX IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS 349 
nonconsent nor the notion of gender exploitation is adequate for expressing 
this new legal category. Rather, the key to understanding SAR offenses is 
the concept of abuse of authority. This idiom (or some variation of it, such 
as exploitation of authority) already appears in many SAR provisions.17 
However, current theories do not dwell on it, nor do they seriously consider 
authority or abuse of authority as the conceptual focal point of SAR 
offenses. This Article aims to fill this void. It draws on Max Weber’s 
account of modern bureaucracy to show that SAR offenses engage a novel 
type of abuse of authority, achieved through the overstepping of 
bureaucratic power into personal relationships. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I introduces SAR legislation and 
case law and describes the crime’s contemporary conceptualization within 
legal theory. Part II offers a new conceptualization for SAR offenses, based 
on social theory of authority. It introduces a new term—charisma of the 
office—and demonstrates its power in analyzing and theorizing SAR 
legislation and case law. Finally, Part III outlines the normative 
implications of this proposed conceptualization. Most importantly, it notes 
that SAR should not be criminalized as a sex offense and a “true crime,” but 
rather criminalized as a regulatory offense. The aim of SAR is neither to 
vindicate sexual autonomy nor to prevent sex discrimination, but rather to 
restrain bureaucratic power and to prevent its expansion into the intimate 
lives of individuals. Ultimately, the normative aim of the new 
conceptualization of SAR offenses is to circumscribe criminalization and 
critique the current expansionist tendencies of both liberal and feminist 
theory. 
I. THE PUZZLE UNDERLYING SAR OFFENSES 
In what follows, I portray the emergence of SAR offenses in two legal 
systems (Israel and the United States), review existing theoretical 
justifications for these offenses, and point to the puzzle underlying SAR—
namely, the lack of a fitting justification for the criminalization of 
seemingly consensual sexual contact. The case law and legislation I present 
do not provide an exhaustive survey of American and Israeli SAR 
legislation and case law, but rather a selection to serve as basis for the 
conceptual analysis hereafter.18 Currently, Israeli and U.S. jurisdictions 
 
17 See, for example, the SAR provision of the Wyoming Criminal Code, which defines 
second-degree sexual assault as any case in which “[t]he actor is in a position of authority 
over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit.” WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-303(a)(vi) (2013). 
18 The statutes and case law discussed infra cover SAR offenses in the context of 
education, employment, and therapy. I have chosen these particular contexts for two main 
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provide an excellent laboratory to conduct this inquiry, as both legal 
systems contemporarily enforce impressive bodies of law in this area. 
American jurisdictions have persistently increased the scope of SAR 
legislation,19 and Israeli courts have written pioneering case law in this 
field20 that is sure to inform theoretical and practical debates worldwide and 
serve any jurisdiction that either has adopted or is considering adopting 
SAR regulations. 
A. PUZZLING STATUTES, PUZZLING CASES 
1. Medical Treatment and Therapy 
A growing body of contemporary American legislation criminalizes 
sexual contact between patients and their doctors, psychologists, and other 
health care providers. According to an exhaustive study published in 
1998,21 at least sixteen American jurisdictions have introduced criminal 
prohibitions against sexual contact in medical treatment,22 and at least 
twenty-two jurisdictions have included criminal prohibitions against sexual 
contact between mental health professionals and their patients.23 Since some 
of these provisions use fraud or similar terms,24 criminalization of sex in 
medical treatment could be perceived as a mere expansion of the traditional 
category of rape by fraud.25 However, the current criminalization of doctor–
 
reasons. First, education, employment, and therapy represent main targets of SAR 
criminalization in Israel and the United States. Second, education, employment, and therapy 
are primary locations of bureaucratic authority in the sense that I discuss hereinafter and 
serve as basis for the theory I develop regarding charisma of the office. See infra Part II.B. 
For a survey of additional areas of criminalization in Israeli and U.S. jurisdictions, such as 
clergy, custodial settings, and guardianship, see Galia Schneebaum, Offenses of Sexual 
Abuse in Authority Relations: Beyond Liberalism and Radical Feminism (August 2012) 
(unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Tel-Aviv University) (on file with author). 
19 Susan A. Lentz & Robert H. Chaires, Sexual Assault Statutes Targeting Authority & 
Power Imbalances: A Step Forward in Rape Law Reform?, 3 FREEDOM CENTER J. 1, 26 
(2011).  
20 See discussion of Israeli case law, infra Part I.A. 
21 See Falk, supra note 13. 
22 Id. at 93. 
23 Id. at 96. A more recent study, published in 2011, documents over twenty states’ 
criminalization of sexual contact in such relationships. See Lentz & Chaires, supra note 19, 
at 27. 
24 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3502(a)(3) (2007). The Kansas provision defines as 
rape any case in which the victim’s consent to intercourse was obtained “through a knowing 
misrepresentation made by the offender that the sexual intercourse was a medically or 
therapeutically necessary procedure . . . .” 
25 The category of rape by fraud (or deception) is a recognized category of rape in 
common law jurisdictions. SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 337–
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patient sex extends far beyond the traditional “rape by fraud” cases. 
Conventional criminal law concepts no longer capture its essence. 
Texas’s legislation, for example, uses an overarching category of “sex 
without consent” as its primary definition for sexual assault. This legislation 
identifies sexual relations with health care providers as nonconsensual in 
cases where “the actor is a mental health services provider or a health care 
services provider who causes the other person, who is a patient or former 
patient of the actor, to submit or participate by exploiting the other person’s 
emotional dependency on the actor.”26 Other jurisdictions specify a per se 
rule prohibiting sexual contact during therapy and do not require any 
additional elements such as fraud, coercion, or exploitation, as Texas does. 
The North Dakota code is illustrative of this point: 
Any person who is or who holds oneself out to be a therapist and who intentionally 
has sexual contact, as defined in section 12.1-20-02, with a patient or client during 
any treatment, consultation, interview, or examination is guilty of a class C felony. 
Consent by the complainant is not a defense under this section.27 
Israel has also adopted a criminal prohibition against sexual contact in 
therapy.28 Yet even before the Knesset enacted legislation,29 the Israeli 
Supreme Court had acknowledged the claim of sexual abuse in medical 
relations through expansive interpretations of the offense of rape.30 The 
Tayeb case31 is especially interesting for two reasons: first, because the 
 
42 (8th ed. 2007). One subcategory of rape by fraud was traditionally applied to sexual 
intercourse under the guise of medical examination. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 
861 (4th ed. 2003). 
26 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b) (West 2011). 
27 N.D. CENT. CODE §12.1-20-06.1 (2012). Idaho provides another example of a per se 
prohibition against therapeutic sex. Its code specifies that  
[a]ny person acting or holding himself out as a physician, surgeon, dentist, psychotherapist, 
chiropractor, nurse or other medical care provider as defined in this section, who engages in an 
act of sexual contact with a patient or client, is guilty of sexual exploitation by a medical care 
provider. For the purposes of this section, consent of the patient or client receiving medical care 
or treatment shall not be a defense. 
 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919(a) (2004). Note that unlike the Texas provision, the word 
“exploitation” here does not constitute an independent element of the offense, but merely 
appears in the title of the offense. 
28 Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 347A (1977). The Israeli offense 
is narrower than the Texas legislation, as it applies only to mental health providers and not to 
the general medical profession.  
29 The Knesset is the Israeli Parliament, which is authorized to enact legislation. 
30 See, e.g., CrimA 7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel IsrSC 49(1) PD 2, 15–22 [1995] 
(Isr.). Israeli rape law has its origins in the English common law, which became effective in 
Israel during the British Mandate (1922–1948). 
31 CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289 [2000] (Isr.). 
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Court expanded the rape offense beyond its traditional bounds, and second, 
because it illustrates the lack of an appropriate legal vocabulary or coherent 
justification for the criminalization of SAR. 
In Tayeb, a young female patient attended a Jerusalem clinic for 
physical therapy for her ankle.32 The patient had three satisfactory 
sessions.33 During her fourth visit, the therapist, Morris Tayeb, deviated 
from his regular treatment routine. He first asked the complainant if she 
suffered pain in her back or neck in addition to her ankle.34 When she 
responded in the affirmative, he asked her to take off her shirt and to lie on 
the treatment bed.35 He gave her a massage around her back and neck, 
occasionally touching her stomach and breasts.36 Then he unbuttoned his 
pants and commanded her to perform oral sex.37 To this, the patient quietly 
submitted.38 The defendant simultaneously inserted his finger into the 
complainant’s vagina.39 A few minutes later, she left the room while Tayeb 
stated, “I didn’t force you, did I? These things happen . . . .”40 The 
overwhelmed patient uttered, “I forgive you,” and quickly left the room.41 
She later filed a complaint with the police, and Tayeb was indicted for 
rape.42 
The Supreme Court convicted the therapist of rape43 even though 
Tayeb did not use physical force, threats, or false pretenses to coerce the 
victim into submission. Judge Englard, delivering the majority opinion, 
relied on the existing rape statute, particularly those elements that constitute 
“lack of consent” due to incompetence.44 Article 345(a)(4) and (5) of 
Israel’s Penal Law prohibit sexual intercourse when the woman is unable to 
provide free consent either because she is unconscious, mentally ill or 
 
32 Id. at 296. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. at 297. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 The defendant told the complainant “suck it, suck it.” Id. at 297. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 298. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 296 (discussing the indictment); id. at 298 (discussing complainant filing the 
complaint). 
43 Id. at 316. The Supreme Court overruled the trial court’s decision, which acquitted the 
defendant from rape and convicted him with a lesser offense, under the Indecent Act. The 
Supreme Court actually convicted the defendant of two separate offenses under Israel’s 
Penal Law: rape, for the act of inserting his finger into the victim’s vagina, and sodomy, for 
the act of inserting his penis into the victim’s mouth. 
44 Id. at 313–16. 
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deficient, or because of any other condition that prevents her from 
resisting.45 Traditionally, the “any other condition” provision was applied to 
non-enumerated situations that nevertheless involved legal incompetence. 
For example, the prohibition had been applied to situations like having 
sexual contact with an intoxicated woman.46 In Tayeb, however, the 
Supreme Court was willing to interpret the “any other condition” alternative 
more leniently. It ruled that while lying on the treatment bed, the patient 
was completely unprepared for the defendant’s sexual act.47 Under these 
circumstances, the court concluded, the victim’s ability to resist the 
defendant was “significantly impaired” to a degree that was enough to 
satisfy Article 345 (a)(4).48 
While the Court’s judicial acrobatics resonate with the reality of 
therapeutic relations, they are insufficient to account for the wrongdoing 
involved in SAR cases. Why should we consider a fully conscious and 
capable woman incompetent? Some scholars refer to the emotional 
vulnerability of patients within the doctor–patient relationship as the core 
issue, especially within mental therapy.49 Similarly, the Texas legislation 
mentioned above notes a patient’s vulnerability in a doctor–patient 
relationship as the potential grounds for criminalization. But why would we 
criminalize the abuse of emotional vulnerability? Surely we would not 
convict a man who picked up a woman in a bar and had sex with her, even 
if she were “emotionally vulnerable” at the time. I argue that SAR offenses 
are not concerned merely with dependence, as dependence is inherent in 
many human relationships and even in benign interactions, including 
marriage. Rather, SAR offenses address a distinct type of relationship and 
are concerned with a more specific form of abuse. The current legal system, 
however, lacks the conceptual framework to discriminate between these and 
other noncriminal behavior. 
2. Employment and Education 
An analogous development has taken place in the field of employment 
and education. Whereas jurisdictions in the United States have taken the 
 
45 Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, 42 LSI 57, §§ 345(a)(4)–(a)(5) (1987–1988). 
46 CrimA 61/79 State of Israel v. Ploni 33(3) PD 688 [1980] (Isr.). 
47 The complainant’s own words are cited in the decision, describing her surprise by the 
defendant’s move: “Everything was within seconds, as I said, that was like, other than the 
massage which took a long time, this was bang so there was no [sic] really time, I don’t 
know.” Tayeb, 54(3) PD at 315. 
48 Id. 
49 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 207 (1998). 
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lead in criminalizing SAR in medical and therapeutic relationships,50 Israel 
has focused on employment relationships.51 In the United States, the 
criminalization of sexual abuse in employment is less common,52 but 
American feminist scholars have proposed introducing criminal legislation 
into the workplace.53 Some U.S. legislators have already taken steps to 
criminalize SAR offenses in educational institutions.54 
A 1988 provision added to the sex offenses section of the Israeli Penal 
Law illustrates the conceptual question raised by new SAR offenses. The 
provision proscribes an actor from having intercourse with a woman over 
the age of eighteen within employment supervisory relations “by exploiting 
[the actor’s] authority in employment or service.”55 This provision 
introduces new terminology: “exploitation of authority.” Reading this and 
provisions from other jurisdictions,56 we now face the questions of what is 
abuse of authority and what is the underlying concept of wrongdoing in 
SAR offenses. 
 
50 As I showed supra, several American jurisdictions had taken steps by 1998 to 
criminalize SAR in therapeutic relationships, while such an offense was enacted in Israel in 
2003. See supra notes 21–23, 28, and accompanying text. 
51 The Israeli offense of SAR in employment was enacted in 1988 as part of an extensive 
reform to the sex offense chapter of the Penal Law. Israel Penal Law, 5748–1988, 41 LSI 57 
(1987–1988). 
52 Sexual harassment in employment is treated in American law as a form of (civil) sex 
discrimination, often under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. For a survey of American sexual 
harassment law, see Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 
49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 692–98 (1997). One category of sexual harassment is known as “quid 
pro quo harassment.” It takes place whenever a workplace supervisor presents sexual 
demands and makes submission to them a term or condition of an individual’s employment. 
Since quid pro quo harassment involves a supervisor–employee relationship, it overlaps with 
certain SAR cases. However, the doctrines of sexual harassment and SAR are different and 
have different foci. First, while sexual harassment doctrine focuses on the negative 
employment consequences that might follow from sexual noncompliance by the employee, 
SAR focuses on a different harm—i.e., the harm involved in the sexual act itself if it does 
take place. Secondly, and more profoundly, as I argue infra, while sexual harassment is 
concerned with the protection of socially disadvantaged groups from discrimination, SAR is 
concerned with the prevention of abuse of authority. 
53 Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 
13 LAW & INEQ. 213, 214 (1995); Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced 
Submission in the Workplace and in the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 420 
(2010). 
54 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7(b) (2013). 
55 Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977).  
56 See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2(n) (LexisNexis 2007). Like the Israeli 
provision, the New Hampshire provision employs a “use of authority position” wording (“A 
person is guilty of the felony of aggravated felonious sexual assault if [he] engages in sexual 
penetration with another person . . . [w]hen the actor is in a position of authority over the 
victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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In Ben-Hayim, the Israeli Supreme Court attempted to tackle these 
questions for the first time.57 A post office manager made sexual advances 
to an employee who was twenty years his junior, even at times visiting her 
apartment.58 He promised to help her gain permanent employment with the 
Israeli Civil Service.59 The employee cooperated with the manager’s sexual 
advances, although, as noted by the Court, at times uncomfortably and 
apparently without desire.60 As time advanced, she decided to end the 
relationship.61 The Court convicted Ben-Hayim of the SAR offense that 
prohibited “intercourse by consent.”62 
In interpreting the element of “abuse,” the Court began by listing one 
obvious example of such exploitation: when the authority explicitly 
threatens the subordinate, such as “the making of an open and direct 
threat—‘do what I want or I will show you the power of my 
authority . . . .’”63 Bearing in mind the nature of supervisory relations within 
employment, extortion—the use of illegitimate threats to obtain something 
of value out of the victim64—does seem particularly relevant to such 
contexts. The very position of a workplace supervisor or an educational 
functionary provides him or her with extended access to a multitude of 
resources to use to extort sex from a subordinate. However, the Court was 
unsatisfied with the use of explicit threats or with extortion as the 
exhaustive meaning of abuse. The Court, moreover, did not focus on the 
 
57 CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD 257 [2005] (Isr.), translated in 
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376 [2005] (Isr). The Supreme Court 
decided the case as a disciplinary appeal and addressed the criminal provision of SAR as part 
of its ruling on the disciplinary charges against Ben-Hayim within the Israeli Civil Service. 
However, the case became an authority on the interpretation of the criminal provision of 
SAR under the Penal Law. See CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) PD 172, 
184, 186 [2005] (Isr.) (citing Ben-Hayim throughout and noting the power a person of 
authority has over his subordinates).  
58 Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 261, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 380.  
59 Id. 
60 Id., translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 381. 
61 Id. 
62 Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977). 
63 Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 388. 
64 Common law prohibitions against extortion were originally limited to property or to 
other pecuniary interests. MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.4. However, in recent years there has 
been a growing tendency to extend extortion prohibitions beyond nonpecuniary interests. 
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.5, for an American example of these extortion 
prohibitions. See, e.g., Israel Penal Law, 5737-1977, LSI Special Volume, § 428 (1977), for 
an Israeli example. Specifically, sexual extortion—the use of illegitimate threats to induce 
the victim into having sex—was addressed in the 1960s under the Model Penal Code as 
Gross Sexual Imposition, carrying a ten-year imprisonment sentence. MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 213.1(2). 
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supervisor’s promise to promote the complainant and did not base its 
judgment on a criminal quid pro quo theory.65 Instead, the Court concluded 
that “[c]onduct that amounts to an ‘abuse of authority’ may take on many 
different guises”66 and that “[i]n any case, the question whether or not the 
supervisor abused his power in order to obtain the consent to the sexual acts 
will always be examined against the background of the circumstances of the 
case and the context in which the acts were committed in each case.”67 
The fundamental point in Ben-Hayim is the substantive link between 
the element of abuse and the victim of the offense. The Court held that:  
In any case, whatever the guise that the element of an ‘abuse of authority’ takes, the 
significance is always the same: obtaining the consent of the subordinate to do acts 
which he does not really want to do but which he is induced to do as a result of the 
abuse of the position of authority68  
and in fact endorsed an understanding of SAR under a consent theory.69 
While aiming to provide instruction for the future adjudication of SAR 
cases, however, the Court was unable to provide clear guidelines for 
assessing consent or exploitation in such cases.70 In light of the Israeli 
Supreme Court’s judgment, we are left with important questions 
unanswered. How can exploitive situations be differentiated from 
nonexploitive ones and consensual sex from nonconsensual sex in 
employment supervisory relations? If SAR is a new category of sexual 
nonconsent, why is the offense titled “forbidden intercourse by consent”?71  
 
65 See Baker, supra note 53, at 230 (advocating the criminalization of sex within 
workplace supervisory relationships under a quid pro quo theory, which views such cases as 
criminal extortion). Unlike sexual harassment regulation, which proscribes supervisory 
threats as well as promises of reward as quid pro quo harassment, criminal law has 
traditionally distinguished between threats and offers, proscribing threats as illegitimate 
coercion while allowing offers as legitimate bargain. Legal scholars have recently challenged 
the traditional distinction by considering certain offers as coercive as well. For a discussion 
of “coercive offers,” see ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 202–21 (1987). The important point 
for our present purposes is to note that the Supreme Court in Israel has refused to limit the 
meaning of the abuse element in SAR offenses to threats or to offers, and thus has rejected a 
quid pro quo understanding of SAR. 
66 Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 388. 
67 Id. at 270, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 391. 
68 Id. at 268, translated in Ben-Hayim, I IsrLR at 388. 
69 For a similar interpretation of SAR under a consent theory, see, e.g., Scadden v. State, 
732 P.2d 1036, 1039–40 (Wyo. 1987). 
70 Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD at 270, translated in Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR at 394. The Court does 
mention several parameters that may help to determine abuse in future cases, such as the 
disparity of forces or the age gap between the parties. However, the judgment points out that 
the above factors do not exhaust the different considerations that are relevant to the issue, 
and therefore each individual case should be decided according to its circumstances. 
71 Israel Penal Law, (5737-1977), LSI Special Volume, § 346(b) (1977).  
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B. DISSATISFYING THEORIES 
Despite many SAR cases receiving in-depth media coverage,72 legal 
scholarship has, so far, paid minimal and sporadic attention to the 
underlying theory.73 Moreover, present accounts typically do not 
systematically treat SAR offenses as a distinct field. This is indicative of 
contemporary SAR theory: the majority of existing scholarship has been 
guided by the idea that SAR is another form of nonconsensual sexual 
contact. Hence, it considers SAR together with other categories of 
nonviolent sexual conduct (such as fraud and extortion) and includes SAR 
in the general discussion of the problem of criminalizing nonviolent (and 
nonconsensual) sexual conduct.74 
 
72 For an example of Israeli media coverage, see Efrat Weiss, Hebrew University 
Professor Suspect for Sexual Involvement with Students in Abuse of Authority, YNET (July 
30, 2008, 5:00 PM), http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3575505,00.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/YZD3-ZXNB. For an example of U.S. media coverage, see Paul Richter, 
Army Sergeant Gets 25-Year Term for Rapes, L.A. TIMES (May 7, 1997), http://articles.
latimes.com/1997-05-07/news/mn-56313_1_25-year-term, archived at http://perma.cc/WP8
P-WVCQ.  
73 American literature is addressed below. See infra notes 87, 91, 95–98, 101–105 and 
accompanying text. For Israeli literature, see KOBI VARDI, SEXUAL EXPLOITATION IN 
THERAPY (2001) (describing the problem of sexual exploitation in therapy, and examining 
various legal means to handle it); Michal Shaked, How Brigadier General Nir Galili Lost 
His Chance for Promotion, 9 PLILIM 443 (2000) (offering a narrative reading of a decision 
by the High Court of Justice, reviewing the promotion of a brigadier general in the Israeli 
Army accused of having a sexual affair with a female subordinate). Shaked’s analysis is 
quite unique in the field, for she employs a descriptive rather than a normative methodology. 
Instead of advocating some kind of desired reform, her account carefully reads the Galili 
opinion, depicts its novelty in setting new standards for amorous relations in the army, and 
then tries to assess the deeper cultural meaning of the legal development. Noya Rimalt and 
Orit Kamir, two prominent feminist scholars in Israel, did not address SAR extensively in 
their writing. Rather, both of them mentioned certain SAR provisions or SAR cases briefly, 
mostly in the specific (and limited) context of the Law for the Prevention of Sexual 
Harassment. See Noya Rimalt, On Sex, Sexuality and Human Dignity: The Law for the 
Prevention of Sexual Harassment in Light of Feminist Theory and Legal Reality, 
35 MISHPATIM 601, 627–31 (2005) (analyzing the Galili case from a feminist theory 
standpoint); Orit Kamir, Sexual Harassment: Sex Discrimination, or an Injury to Human 
Dignity?, 29 MISHPATIM 317 (1998).  
74 The problem of criminalizing nonviolent, nonconsensual sexual conduct has become 
central to the American deliberation of rape law in the last three decades. The traditional 
common law definition of rape required use of physical force. LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 857 
(citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *210). In recent years, however, the force 
requirement began losing its exclusivity in the definition of rape. Israel eliminated the force 
requirement from the definition of rape in 2001. American jurisdictions, on the other hand, 
were less willing to divorce the physically-violent model of rape law, and this insistence 
gained considerable criticism in American legal literature. SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at x 
(“Sexual misconduct is considered rape only when a man deploys physical force—and often 
not even then. Yet consent is far from voluntary when it is given in response to extortionate 
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In what follows, I describe existing literature on SAR offenses. These 
accounts utilize two distinct terminologies inspired by liberalism and 
radical feminism: one includes nonconsent, coercion, and offense-to-
autonomy; the other, asymmetric power and gender exploitation. While 
these terminologies are grounded in well-known theories, current legal 
scholarship fails to properly conceptualize SAR as a legal wrong. This has 
led commentators and legal practitioners to overlook SAR’s distinctiveness 
and to underappreciate the novelty of this legal category. As I show 
below,75 an appropriate conceptualization should carry important doctrinal 
and punitive implications for SAR regulation.  
1. The Liberal Conceptualization 
Liberal theory is the dominant theory on modern sex offenses. While 
legal regulation of sex dates back to ancient times,76 its establishment in 
liberal values is relatively new.77 The transition may be described as 
relinquishing a traditional view, where sexual bans were derived primarily 
from status (mostly the status of marriage),78 and adopting a modern view,79 
viewing individuals, rather than predetermined social status or moralistic 
norms, as the sole and final decisionmakers in matters concerning their 
sexuality. Through the course of this development, liberal theory emerged. 
It considers sexual autonomy80 the underlying value of modern rape law, 
and nonconsent81 the primary element of modern rape law doctrine. 
 
threats or the persistent sexual demands of a woman’s doctor, lawyer, or psychiatrist.”); 
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986). 
75 See infra Part III. 
76 For the history of rape law, see SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, 
WOMEN AND RAPE 18 (1975) (describing rape in historical times as a property crime against 
the woman’s husband or father). Another important, and very interesting, historiography of 
rape law was composed in recent years by Anne Coughlin. Coughlin argues that rape 
traditionally served to exonerate women from another accusation—adultery, when sex out of 
wedlock constituted a serious offense alongside rape. This, according to Coughlin, explains 
why rape victims were required to demonstrate “resistance to the utmost.” Anne M. 
Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 14, 30–35 (1998). 
77 Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 
122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1381 (2013). 
78 And thus marital rape was traditionally exempted from the legal definition of rape. For 
an overview of the marital exemption of rape in American law, including its historical 
origins at common law, see MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 (Official Draft 
& Revised Comments 1962). For discussion of the marital exemption under Israeli law, see 
Yoram Shachar, Lawfully Raped?, 8 IYUNEI MISHPAT 649 (1982). 
79 For a description of the evolution of rape law from traditional to modern views in the 
United States, see LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 847–50. 
80 Stephen Schulhofer offers the most comprehensive theory of sexual autonomy under 
American legal scholarship. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 49 (arguing that sexual autonomy 
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In this vein, the development of rape law reform and its move beyond 
the exclusivity of physical force in rape law is important. As soon as rape 
was detached from its origins and came to be acknowledged as a crime 
against autonomy, it was no longer evident that physical force, which was 
central to the traditional definition of rape (“the carnal knowledge of a 
woman forcibly and against her will”82) was still material to the modern 
definition of rape. The question, in fact, was even broader than that. If rape 
was about sexual autonomy, new questions opened up to the meaning and 
proper scope of autonomy, and the variety of circumstances under which, 
even without physical coercion, a person’s submission to sex would 
adequately qualify as valid consent.83 Specifically, jurists urged expanding 
rape law beyond physical coercion to include two main categories of 
nonconsensual sex: sex based upon coercive threats and sex through 
fraudulent claims.84 These two categories have long been categories of 
nonconsent in other legal fields, such as property with “theft by fraud” and 
“theft by extortion.” With the liberalization of sex offenses, commentators 
called for their recognition within this field as well. 
A similar line of thought found certain SAR cases worthy of 
criminalization. These accounts suggested that even though SAR offenses 
 
should be viewed as a fundamental legal entitlement deserving the protection of the law just 
as other legal entitlements, such as the right to property or to physical security, and testing 
the application of sexual autonomy theory in different contexts such as sexual bargaining, 
professional authority relations, and more); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy 
Seriously: Rape Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992) (paraphrasing Ronald 
Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously and offering a theory of sexual autonomy as a distinctive 
constituent of personhood and freedom). For additional sources on sexual autonomy, see 
Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force 
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780 (1992) (acknowledging sexual 
autonomy as justifying the criminalization of some instances of coercive sex that are short of 
physical violence); Dorothy E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 359 (1993) (developing a theory of sexual autonomy as underlying rape law 
and objecting to any sharp distinction between violent and non-violent breach of sexual 
autonomy). For a recent critique on sexual autonomy as the underlying value of rape law, see 
Rubenfeld, supra note 77. 
81 See e.g., ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS (2003) (offering an in-
depth analysis of the concept of consent in sexual relations from a legal, as well as moral, 
standpoint). 
82 This is the common law definition of rape. LAFAVE, supra note 25, at 857 (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
83 See Ann T. Spence, A Contract Reading of Rape Law: Redefining Force to Include 
Coercion, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 57 (2003) (identifying a need, in contemporary 
rape law reform, to define “coercion” beyond physical coercion, and offering to import 
contract law conceptions of coercion into rape law to achieve that purpose). 
84 See Estrich, supra note 74, at 1120. 
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do not always involve physical violence,85 the sex was nevertheless 
imposed on the victim, and thus she was forced into having unwanted sex. 
Legal literature, case law, and regulations note that while many SAR cases 
tell the story of a seemingly consensual sexual encounter—i.e., the 
subordinate did not resist, but rather submitted to the authority figure’s 
sexual initiatives—submission should not be viewed as valid consent, but 
“technical,”86 “tainted,”87 “inauthentic,”88 “flawed,”89 or “coerced”90 
consent. Since the balance of power in authority relations may lead 
subordinates to accede to unwanted sexual advances made by someone in a 
superior position, criminal law, through codifying SAR offenses, steps in to 
protect potential victims from wrongful sexual imposition and infringement 
of their right to sexual autonomy.91 
 
85 The famous Israeli Katzav case, dealing with sexual charges against the former 
president of the state, is, in this respect, atypical since most of the charges included force and 
Katzav was ultimately convicted with forcible rape. See CrimA 3372/11 Katzav v. State of 
Israel (Nov. 10, 2011), Israel Supreme Court Database (Isr.), available at http://elyon1.court.
gov.il/files/11/720/033/c34/11033720.c34.htm, archived at http://vperma.cc/B2LR-WKYZ. 
86 CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel 60(2) PD 172, 184 [2005] (Isr.). The 
Israeli Supreme Court held that “even if consent was given”, “criminal law, by taking into 
account the inferior position of the victim and the imbalance of power between the parties, 
treats this consent as merely technical, rather than legally effective.” Id. (emphasis added). 
87 See Schulhofer, supra note 80, at 77–84 (discussing cases of sexual abuse within 
professional and institutional authority under the title “tainted consent”). 
88 CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 60(1) PD 257, 268 [2005] (Isr.), translated 
in CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim 1 IsrLR 376, 391 [2005] (Isr). Interpreting the 
offense of SAR in employment, the Israeli Supreme Court held that “this offense engages 
situations in which the victim allegedly consented to the sexual act” but “since this consent 
was achieved through an abuse or in exploitation of a position of authority . . . this gives rise 
to a suspicion that consent under such circumstance is in fact not free but inauthentic.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
89 “As a general rule, it is inappropriate for the state to limit sexual relations between 
consenting adults; in therapy, however, and specifically in mental therapy, consent by the 
patient is not real but flawed.” Explanatory Note to the Draft Bill Amending the Penal Law 
(Exploitation of Patient’s Dependence in Therapy) (No. 71), 2002, HH 868 (Isr.) (emphasis 
added). 
90 The wording “coerced consent” appears in American SAR provisions. See, e.g., N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 632-A:2(I)(n) (LexisNexis 2007) (“A person is guilty of the felony of 
aggravated felonious sexual assault if such person engages in sexual penetration with another 
person . . . when the actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this authority 
to coerce the victim to submit . . . .” (emphasis added)). Similarly, Falk speaks of “coercion” 
as including extortion, as well as abuse-of-authority cases. Falk, supra note 13, at 47 
(“[R]ape by coercion cases involve the abuse of authority and sexual extortion.” (emphasis 
added)).  
91 Falk advocates the criminalization of abuse-of-authority cases (and other types of 
sexual imposition, such as extortion and fraud) under rape law, since this area of law is 
“designed to protect victims’ sexual integrity as well as physical security” and therefore it 
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The fundamental problem with the proposition mentioned above is that 
it uses the terms “consent” and “coercion” in a rhetorical fashion. Many 
SAR cases do not conform to any of the categories of nonconsent 
traditionally recognized under common law: incapacity, coercion through 
threats (extortion), and fraud. Indeed, as we have seen, certain SAR cases 
involve fraud,92 and others involve coercive threats,93 but many SAR cases 
and many SAR provisions do not include these elements.94 The typical 
scenario described in these cases is of two mature partners who engage in 
sexual relations with no explicit threat or fraudulent claims by the offender 
and with no expression of nonconsent by the victim. 
One proposition, raised in the context of employment, has been to 
conceive SAR under a theory of implicit extortion. Stephen Schulhofer—an 
American commentator writing within the liberal tradition—considered the 
following example. Sally and her boss Bill are working together on a 
project late at night.95 When they are about to leave the office, Bill invites 
Sally for a drink. Bill’s invitation is not communicated during official 
working hours since Sally and Bob were clearly done working that day. 
Moreover, it is possible that Sally is attracted to Bill and will be delighted 
to have a relationship with him. Yet, claims Schulhofer, 
Bill’s seemingly innocent act of asking Sally for a date can pose serious problems. He 
has enormous power to affect her career, whether he mentions it or not. And Sally 
would know that a decision to turn him down cannot help but color his feelings about 
her. So Sally might feel under pressure to accept, whether she really wants to or not.96  
Schulhofer, in other words, identifies the potential for abuse as having to do 
with the supervisor’s principal control over the employee’s working 
conditions. This control is always there, even if the supervisor does not 
“threaten” to use it explicitly. The question arises, however, whether 
 
should be expanded “to include a broader range of methods by which sexual predation is 
accomplished . . . .” Falk, supra note 13, at 141. 
92 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
93 See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103 (Mont. 1990) (involving a high-school 
principal who threatened to block a student’s graduation if she failed to meet his sexual 
demands).  
94 For my discussion of SAR cases, see supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing 
CSA 4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, IsrSC 60(1) 257 [2005] (Isr.), translated in CSA 
4790/04 State of Israel v. Ben-Hayim, 1 IsrLR 376 [205] (Isr.)); supra note 31 and 
accompanying text (discussing CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289 
[2000] (Isr.)). For my discussion of SAR provisions, see supra notes 26–28 and 
accompanying text.  
95 SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 168. 
96 Id. at 168–69. 
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“retaliation is an ever present danger”97 may still be understood as 
“extortion.” 
Technically, it is possible to strain the words “implicit threat” to 
encompass the ever-present danger that a workplace supervisor would 
retaliate against a subordinate for turning down his sexual advances. This, 
however, seems to distort the concept of extortion. Extortion requires 
something more than a mere potential for extortion. Even the most subtle, 
implicit threat needs, or traditionally was thought to require, something 
more than the kind of potential for retaliation that exists in employment 
supervisory relations. 98 
Current legal accounts do not offer a satisfying theory to explain how 
and why consent is invalidated in these cases. Absent such a theory, the 
current discourse’s use of the terms coercion and nonconsent is 
unconvincing. The mere fact that the victim did not genuinely want sex 
does not qualify as proper conceptualization of these offenses. The leap 
from assuming unwanted sexual contact to concluding nonconsensual 
sexual contact is unfounded. It ends up transforming consent into a 
psychological experience,99 which makes significant the victim’s inner will 
(or lack thereof) in sexual contact. The long tradition of categories of 
nonconsent stands to testify that authenticating will has never been a strong 
point of criminal law. People may submit to sexual initiatives for a range of 
reasons that do not necessarily reflect their true desire for sex. And these 
actions are ordinarily not criminalized as sex offenses.100 
Schulhofer seemed to be the most aware of SAR’s unique conceptual 
challenges. He sought to anchor SAR in recognized categories of 
nonconsent (such as extortion and fraud) but repeatedly pointed to the 
irrelevance of these categories for SAR conceptualization. Schulhofer’s 
 
97 Id. at 183. 
98 Schulhofer therefore concludes that traditional coercion or extortion provisions would 
not treat the above-mentioned Bob and Sally example as a criminal offense. See id. at 169. 
99 The understanding of consent as a psychological phenomenon (also known as the 
“subjectivist view of consent”) was defended in recent years by Heidi Hurd and Larry 
Alexander. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, in 2 LEGAL THEORY 121 (Larry 
Alexander et al. eds., 1996); Larry Alexander, The Moral Magic of Consent (II), in 2 LEGAL 
THEORY, supra, at 165. For a critique of this approach, see WERTHEIMER, supra note 81, at 
144–46.  
100 Wertheimer discusses an example that illustrates the point. A and B have been dating 
for a while but did not have sex until, at some point, A (typically the male) says to B 
(typically the female): “[E]ither we have sex, or I’m terminating the relationship.” If B then 
gives in to the sexual pressure, she probably (or at least arguably) does not respond out of 
true sexual desire; however, criminal law would not tag her submission as nonconsent or 
offense to autonomy. In the words of Wertheimer, while “A’s proposal may be wrong, crude, 
insensitive,” it is not coercive. WERTHEIMER, supra note 81, at 164–70.  
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early writings conclude that autonomy “tied to already firm social 
understandings” is of no assistance for SAR theory, since existing 
conceptions of autonomy do not consider SAR offensive to autonomy.101 
However, Schulhofer was more supportive of the view that SAR should be 
treated as an offense to autonomy (and possibly even criminalized as such) 
in his book, Unwanted Sex, published some years later. The book’s 
conclusions advocated criminalization of SAR in mental therapeutic 
relations102 and his analysis throughout the book supported the risk to 
autonomy in contexts such as employment,103 education,104 and the like. Yet 
the book’s overall analysis did not clearly lay out a conceptual basis for 
considering SAR a legal offense to autonomy. Whenever he referred to 
SAR cases absent extortion and fraud, Schulhofer resorted to a rhetorical 
use of autonomy, consent, or freedom of choice.105 His account supposed 
that sex in authority relations is often unwanted (as his book title suggests), 
but it did not supply a proper reason to invalidate the subordinate’s consent 
to sex in authority relations. Furthermore, it did not indicate a reason why 
unwanted sex within authority relations should be criminalized, when so 
many other cases involving unwanted sex, or not-entirely-authentic desire 
for sex, are not criminalized. 
2. The Feminist Conceptualization 
Another concept of SAR comes from the radical feminist movement. 
As opposed to other feminist schools,106 radical feminism directs its 
 
101 Schulhofer, supra note 80, at 83. 
102 SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 284 (proposing a Model Criminal Statute for Sexual 
Offenses, under which sexual penetration would be punished as sexual abuse, a felony of the 
third degree, if the actor engaged in “providing professional treatment, assessment, or 
counseling of a mental or emotional illness, symptom, or condition of the victim over a 
period concurrent with or substantially contemporaneous with the time when the act of 
sexual penetration occurs”). 
103 Id. at 183 (“A worker pressured for sex by her boss isn’t completely free to ‘just say 
no,’ because retaliation is an ever-present danger, one that existing law does not effectively 
deter.”). 
104 Id. at 192 (“At the college and graduate school levels, sexual interaction between 
students and teachers becomes more frequent, and much of it is directly or indirectly 
coercive.”) 
105 For example, he writes, “Without explicit threats or other improper inducements, 
freedom of choice can still be affected by the distribution of power in particular settings. 
Consent can be tainted by constraints that are inherent in relationships between teachers and 
students, between job supervisors and their subordinates, and between prison guards and 
inmates.” Id. at 112 (emphases added). 
106 Feminist thought contains many different schools, but it is common to refer to three 
major strands: liberal feminism, cultural feminism, and radical feminism. For a survey of 
feminist strands and their practical influence on various law reforms, see Noya Rimalt, On 
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arguments and critique toward the regulation of sex and profoundly 
challenges the principles of liberal thought. It appeared originally—and in 
its purest form—in the writings of Catherine MacKinnon. Drawing on neo-
Marxist ideology, MacKinnon argued that since females in society are 
profoundly subject to male domination, it is doubtful that female 
submission to sexual demands by males should ever rightfully be viewed as 
“consent.”107 Even in the absence of physical force, fraud, or coercive 
threats—liberal doctrines that other critics of rape law fought so hard to 
apply to the field—MacKinnon argued that it is doubtful female consent to 
sex could ever be a meaningful concept under conditions of male 
domination.108 
Inspired by the challenge posed by radical feminism to the liberal 
notion of consent, feminist writers have been attentive to the inadequacy of 
consent in considering SAR cases.109 Consequently, they often employ 
different terminology for SAR offenses, describing asymmetry or inequality 
between sexual partners. Thus, for example, sexual contact in clergy–
 
Law, Feminism and Social Change: The Example of the Law for the Prevention of Sexual 
Harassment, in STUDIES IN LAW, GENDER AND FEMINISM 985 (Daphne Barak-Erez et al. eds., 
2006). 
107 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 178 (1989) 
(stating that “[i]f sex is normally something men do to women, the issue is less whether there 
was force than whether consent is a meaningful concept”); see also id. at 174 (stating that 
“[p]erhaps the wrong of rape has proven so difficult to define because the unquestionable 
starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from intercourse, while for women it is 
difficult to distinguish the two under conditions of male dominance”). For other works by 
MacKinnon containing earlier versions of these ideas, see Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982); 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).  
108 Id. In her more recent work, MacKinnon addressed more explicitly the 
criminalization of sex under conditions of what she terms “social hierarchy.” CATHARINE 
MACKINNON, WOMEN’S LIVES, MEN’S LAWS 244 (2005). Unlike her previous work, here 
MacKinnon seems to incorporate an awareness of social hierarchy into a legal conception of 
coercion and consent, claiming that “[a]wareness of social hierarchy is absent in the criminal 
law of rape[],” and that “rape is a physical attack of a sexual nature under coercive 
conditions, and inequalities are coercive conditions.” Id. at 244, 247. However, as 
Buchhandler-Raphael rightly observes, MacKinnon does not develop these observations into 
a full conceptual framework for justifying the criminalization of sex under conditions of 
social hierarchy, nor does she develop the pragmatic implications of these general ideas. 
Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 53, at 411–12.  
109 Feminist writers have dedicated little attention to discussing sex in authority relations 
as a criminal wrong. MacKinnon’s groundwork theory of sexual harassment includes cases 
dealing with sex within supervisory employment relations, but she conceptualized the abuse 
as a form of (civil) sex discrimination. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 4 (1979).  
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penitent relationships is described as an abuse of “power dependency 
relations”110 and relations between a workplace supervisor and subordinate 
is a “disparate power relationship,”111 or simply an abuse of power.112 
The feminist language of “asymmetry of power” adds an important 
element to understanding SAR. Its advantage over classic liberal language 
is that it grounds SAR in some inherent quality of the authority relations, 
rather than in the offender’s action. American scholar Martha Chamallas 
mentions in her review on Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson113 that “the 
existence of an asymmetric relationship alone was enough to constitute 
intimidation, even if the supervisor had no specific intent to retaliate against 
the noncompliant employee.”114 Seemingly, the language of asymmetry of 
power resonates with an awareness felt in SAR cases: namely, that one 
party is more powerful than the other and that the relations between the 
parties carry a hierarchical nature. 
However, the language of “exploitation of asymmetry of power” or of 
“abuse of power” is inappropriate for SAR conceptualization. The 
terminology of inequality and asymmetry is overinclusive. Inequality is one 
of the most complicated, elusive concepts.115 It can be understood in many 
ways and fails to explain why, under SAR offenses, only specific contexts 
are identified as unequal, rather than conceptualizing sex in every instance 
of social or economic inequality as a legally wrong act against the victim.116 
 
110 See Phyllis Coleman, Sex in Power Dependency Relationships: Taking Unfair 
Advantage of the “Fair” Sex, 53 ALB. L. REV. 95, 95–96 (1988) (arguing that “sexual 
contact occurring within certain human relationships . . . falls on a continuum of a 
presumption of exploitation due to what may be called ‘power dependency.’ Specifically, 
these relationships include parent–child, psychotherapist–patient, physician–patient, clergy–
penitent, professor–student, attorney–client, and employer–employee.” (citations omitted)). 
Coleman’s essay does not address criminal law, but instead treats these cases within a tort 
framework. However, her conceptualization of the relationships as “power dependency” 
relations and her assumption that consent in these cases is defective are equally relevant to 
criminal law.  
111 See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 805 (1988). 
112 Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Sexual Abuse of Power, 21 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
77 (2010) (proposing to conceptualize and to criminalize various instances of unwanted 
sexual relations within professional and institutional settings as sexual abuse of power).  
113 Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Meritor is a leading U.S. case on 
sexual harassment, discussing a sexual affair between a workplace supervisor and a 
subordinate employee. 
114 Chamallas, supra note 111, at 805. 
115 See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE 2 (2000) (pointing out the diversified, 
contested, and controversial meaning of equality in political discourse, as well as in 
philosophical analyses).  
116 Martha Chamallas’s suggestion to neglect consent and move to a standard of 
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SAR offenses relate to authority, implying a notion distinct from gender 
domination and more specific than gender inequality. Moreover, at face 
value, “asymmetry of power” terms could deem that all sex that occurs 
within authority relations is criminal. However, as indicated above,117 many 
SAR provisions prohibit only sexual contact that occurs “in abuse” of an 
authority position. Missing from the feminist discussion is an understanding 
of the natures of authority and its abuse;118 hence, the feminist-inspired 
terms of inequality are inadequate. 
II. RECONCEPTUALIZING SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS 
Part I presented the problems with current legal language and theories 
used in analyzing and adjudicating SAR. This Part proposes a new theory 
for SAR offenses. This theory claims that SAR offenses deal with a distinct 
type of abuse of authority—an abuse of a kind of power that I describe for 
the first time here. I term this power charisma of the office.119 Charisma of 
the office emerges from the modern separation between the professional 
sphere and the personal sphere.120 This separation between spheres is 
central to modern life and usually does not cause difficulty. Every person 
maintains a set of professional connections and a set of personal 
 
“mutuality” in sexual relations as a response to this difficulty is highly contentious. See 
Chamallas, supra note 111, at 835–36. Chamallas’s suggestion to move to a standard of 
mutuality may invoke criticism, but for present purposes, it is important to see that her 
suggestion acknowledges that as soon as we speak of exploitation of an “asymmetry of 
power,” we are no longer in the consent court. Instead, we have to adopt some other 
language to denote such wrongdoing. 
117 See, e.g., Israel Penal Code, (5737-1977), LSI Special Volume, § 346(B) (1977); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632–A:2(n) (LexisNexis 2007). 
118 For a similar critique of the under-consideration of exploitation as a separate element 
in sex offenses, see Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 112, at 138 (mentioning rape law 
reforms that “have failed to articulate the exploitation element, viewing the mere potential 
for exploitation in sexual relationships as enough to justify criminalization”). Buchhandler-
Raphael’s response to this difficulty is to offer an abuse of power model to address sexual 
exploitation within arenas of disparate power (such as the workplace and in the academy). 
Id. at 132. My analysis suggests that the abuse of power model is a step in the right direction, 
but offers a distinct and more rigorous understanding of the power involved, namely, the 
power of authority.  
119 I use charisma here in a way that is almost the opposite of the common use of this 
word. Charisma is usually used in a positive way. I use charisma as generating negative 
reactions, such as compliance. I further elaborate my reasons for choosing the term 
“charisma” infra subpart II.C.  
120 The distinction between a private sphere and public sphere is central to modern 
liberal thought. See generally Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423 (1982) (discussing the history of this distinction). I use 
the less common term “professional sphere” and contrast it with the private sphere following 
Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy. See infra Part II.B.  
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connections, and for the most part these connections are separate. SAR 
offenses deal with cases in which they are not: cases in which two people 
have an authority–subordinate relationship in the professional sphere and 
also interact in the personal sphere. SAR offenses are founded on the 
concern that the dividing line between the professional and the personal 
sphere may be obscured, and that the power held by authority figures in the 
professional sphere may extend impermissibly to the personal sphere. 
Criminal law has, in effect, recognized charisma of the office as a novel 
type of power and is trying to control its abuse. In the following sections, I 
use terms borrowed from social theory121—most notably authority, 
charisma, and office—to develop this new conceptual framework and then 
present it in detail. 
A. THE NATURE OF AUTHORITY 
Social theory portrays authority as a perplexing phenomenon.122 On 
the one hand, it is a type of power that allows some to direct, instruct, and 
guide others.123 On the other hand, it is a type of power that does not 
employ external means of coercion and does not rely on physical force or 
threat of force to its advantage.124 Rather, power is sustained because of the 
followers’ belief in the authority’s legitimacy125 and not through physical 
 
121 My analysis infra relies on the theory of authority appearing in Max Weber’s seminal 
work Economy and Society. In addition, I refer to Hannah Arendt’s essay on authority (What 
Is Authority?) and to some additional observations (on authority) included in her book On 
Violence. I further rely on secondary literature on Arendt and Weber, primarily when such 
sources help illuminate or expand certain aspects of the original texts that are useful for the 
development of SAR theory.  
122 See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 45 (Harcourt, Brace & World 1970) (arguing 
that authority is an “elusive . . . phenomen[on]”).  
123 Weber considers authority as a specific type of domination, which signifies “the 
probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of 
persons.” 1 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., University of California Press 1978) (1922). 
124 Kronman observes that authority—the most durable form of political power—is not 
based on physical compulsion but on a belief in the binding quality of the normative 
principles that justify the authoritarian order. ANTHONY KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 39 (1983). 
125 “Experience shows that in no instance does domination voluntarily limit itself to the 
appeal to material or affectual or ideal motives as basis for its continuance. In addition every 
such system attempts to establish and to cultivate a belief in its legitimacy.” WEBER, supra 
note 123, at 213 (emphasis added). Commenting on Weber, Kronman observes that “the 
hallmark of an authority relationship is the fact that it involves an exercise of power that is 
justified in the eyes of the person being dominated because he acknowledges the normative 
validity of the principle to which the party wielding power appeals as the warrant for his 
actions.” KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 39. 
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coercion or verbal persuasion.126 This special characteristic of authority is 
vital for conceptualizing SAR offenses, since SAR is an offense even when 
the offender does not use coercion. 
The first step in understanding authority is recognizing that authority is 
fundamentally a social power that not only operates within social relations, 
but also originates from society and gains its validity through societal 
norms.127 Hence, the exercise of authority is not an exclusive expression of 
personal traits (such as charm or physical strength), and in the same 
manner, subjection to authority is not an exclusive outcome of individual 
weakness or helplessness.128 Indeed, in Scadden, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court discussed a recent SAR provision, noting: 
[I]t is apparent that the legislature used the word “authority” to mean an externally 
granted power, not a self-generated control. One in a position of authority is a person 
who acquires that status by virtue of society and its system of laws granting to him the 
right of control over another.129 
Therefore, authority is a social power, but two characteristics turn it into a 
distinct type of social power. First, authority involves a hierarchical order of 
command and obedience: it implies a person in a position of authority who 
gives orders and a subordinate who follows these orders.130 The hierarchical 
order of authority, moreover, often takes place routinely rather than 
 
126 [A]uthority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority 
itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which 
presupposes equality, and works through a process of argumentation . . . . If authority is to be 
defined at all, then, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force, and persuasion 
through arguments. 
HANNAH ARENDT, What Is Authority?, in BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: EIGHT EXERCISES IN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 91, 93 (1958). 
127 Weber’s consideration of authority as social order is evident in his introduction of 
basic sociological concepts such as social action, sociological relationship, and legitimate 
order. WEBER, supra note 123, at 3–62. 
128 Weber distinguished between various types of submission in social interaction. 
Particularly, he distinguished between submission which is due to individual weakness and 
submission to authority: 
[P]eople may submit from individual weakness and helplessness because there is no acceptable 
alternative. But these considerations are not decisive for the classification of types of 
domination. What is important is the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is 
to a significant degree and according to its type treated as “valid”; that this fact confirms the 
position of the persons claiming authority and that it helps to determine the choice of means of 
its exercise. 
Id. at 214. 
129 Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1042 (Wyo. 1987). 
130 For Weber’s definition of domination, see WEBER, supra note 123, at 53. See also 
Arendt’s definition of the authoritarian relationship as involving “the one who commands 
and the one who obeys.” ARENDT, supra note 126, at 93. 
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casually. The phrase “authority relations” conveys an enduring reality (a 
“relationship”) rather than an isolated episode.131  
Second, authority is based on a legitimate belief in the authoritarian 
order. Weber thus refers to authority as legitimate domination.132 I shall 
soon return to the notion of legitimacy in greater detail. At present, it is 
important to note that legitimacy enables authority figures to exercise 
power without the actual use of force and without relying on such 
advantages as economic superiority. Grounded in legitimacy, authorities 
operate without coercion. In fact, as Hannah Arendt observed, the use of 
force is often a testimony to the lack of authority: “Since authority always 
demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or 
violence”; however, she continues, “authority precludes the use of external 
means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed.”133 
Authority signifies a form of domination, which is distinct from 
coercion through force, misuse of economic asymmetries, or exploitation of 
individual vulnerabilities. It relies on a hierarchical order of command and 
obedience and on a common belief in the legitimacy of that order.134 
Weber identifies three types135 of existing authority that differ from 
one another in the type of legitimacy upholding them: traditional authority 
rests on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and 
the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them”; charismatic 
authority rests on “devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or 
exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns 
or order revealed or ordained by him”; and rational authority rests “on a 
belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to 
 
131 The durability and stability of authority as a specific type of social power is 
emphasized in Weber’s account. KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 39 (“Although authority is 
merely one form of power, it is, according to Weber, the most stable and enduring form.”). 
132 WEBER, supra note 123, at 215. 
133 ARENDT, supra note 126, at 92–93. 
134 “The authoritarian relationship between the one who commands and the one who 
obeys rests neither on common reason nor on the power of the one who commands; what 
they have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize 
and where both have their predetermined stable place.” Id. at 93. 
135 WEBER, supra note 123, at 215. In accordance with Weber’s methodology, he refers 
to those types as ideal types. An ideal type is a methodological tool that is meant to capture 
the main characteristics of a given social phenomenon in a non-empirical fashion. For the 
methodology of ideal type, see LEWIS A. COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: 
IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT 223–24 (1972). In the particular context of the 
tripartite classification of authority, Weber mentions that neither of these types of authority 
is to be found in historical cases in their pure form, but the consideration of diverse forms of 
authority on the basis of sociological, nonempirical terms (“ideal types”) has clear 
advantages. WEBER, supra note 123, at 216. 
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authority under such rules to issue commands.”136 Weber characterizes the 
types according to different historical periods.137 In particular, rational 
authority is typical of modern times and traditional authority of premodern 
times. Moreover, Weber distinguishes between two different subcategories 
of rational authority: legal (rational) authority and bureaucratic (rational) 
authority.138 SAR offenses specifically engage bureaucratic authority and 
focus on a specific type of abuse—conflation of bureaucratic authority with 
charismatic authority. 
B. BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITY 
1. Bureaucracy and the Authority of Office 
Classic legal thought usually restricts authority to governmental 
authority, and the authority referred to is almost invariably the authority of 
law.139 Yet new prohibitions on sex in employment, therapeutic, and 
educational relationships assume that authority relations exist in a much 
broader scope. These prohibitions are not limited to government employers 
but also apply to authority positions in the private sector. I therefore use 
Weber’s account of bureaucratic authority in modern times to examine 
authority positions in the broader sense. 
Like other scholars, Weber referred to the authority of modern law as 
positive law issued by state institutions.140 He described it as a rational form 
of authority with a human source of legitimacy (reason), rather than a 
divine or transcendental source.141 In addition to the rule of law and the 
 
136 WEBER, supra note 123, at 215. 
137 On the historical dimension of Weber’s tripartite classification of authority, see KEN 
MORRISON, MARX, DURKHEIM, WEBER 362 (2d ed. 2006). 
138 Weber thus dedicates separate attention to legal authority and to bureaucratic 
authority. His account of legal authority is conducted primarily as part of his sociology of 
law. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 641–900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., University of California Press 1978) (1922). His account of 
bureaucratic authority is conducted as part of the sociology of power and domination. 
WEBER, supra note 123, at 212–301. 
139 See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979) (offering a moral–
philosophical account of the authority of law and describing the foundations for the legal 
system’s claim for authority). For a comprehensive account of the shortcomings of classic 
jurisprudence in addressing bureaucratic organizations, see MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, 
PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS (1986). 
140 This understanding of modern law is known as the school of legal positivism. For a 
discussion of legal positivism, see Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHIL. (Fall 2009, Edward N. Zalta (ed.)), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/ 
(last visited October 28, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/L8FR-BSDF. 
141 According to Weber, traditional forms of authority were religious in essence, while 
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authority of the state, Weber identified modern authority in bureaucracy, a 
basic form of administration that is “the root of the modern Western 
state.”142 Weber referred to such authority as bureaucratic and analyzed its 
special characteristics.143 According to Weber, bureaucratic authority 
connotes authority that is granted to people by virtue of their profession144 
or position in an organization’s hierarchy.145 The operation of bureaucratic 
authority spans vast social arenas such as the modern workplace (“the 
office”) and modern hospitals and clinics.146 
In Weberian bureaucracy, individuals receive power based on their 
qualifications and professional training. They exercise that power according 
to their specialized knowledge.147 Thus, Weber’s understanding of 
bureaucracy is not limited to state bureaucracy.148 Accordingly, modern 
hospitals and workplaces are bureaucratic whether they are owned by the 
government or not. Moreover, under Weber’s account, these institutions are 
bureaucratic in a special sense that goes beyond the common connotations 
 
the legitimacy of modern authority rests on its rationality. See supra note 136 and 
accompanying text. 
142 WEBER, supra note 123, at 223. 
143 Id. at 220–26. 
144 Weber hardly ever uses the word “professional.” Instead, he refers to the “technical” 
or “specialized” training of officials under bureaucracy, which signifies precisely the idea of 
professionalism:  
The rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules or norms. In both cases, 
if their application is to be fully rational, specialized training is necessary. It is thus normally true 
that only a person who has demonstrated an adequate technical training is qualified to be a 
member of the administrative staff of such an organized group, and hence only such persons are 
eligible for appointment to official positions. 
Id. at 218. In addition, Weber mentions that “[b]ureaucratic administration means 
fundamentally domination through knowledge.” Id. at 225. 
145 Weber often speaks of officials within hierarchical organizations. For example, he 
refers to the fact that many bureaucratic organizations follow “the principle of hierarchy; that 
is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.” Id. at 218. 
146 “[B]ureaucracy is found in private clinics, as well as in endowed hospitals . . . . 
Bureaucratic organization is well illustrated by the administrative role of the priesthood 
(Kaplanokratie) in the modern [Catholic] church . . . .” Id. at 221. 
147 Id. at 218. Weber further argues that the systematic operation of bureaucracy 
dominates many aspects of modern life. Indeed, according to Weber, almost all areas of 
contemporary life function in this manner—capitalistic corporations, the workplace, the 
healthcare system, and of course state bureaucracy, which is charged with public services: 
“[I]t would be sheer illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can 
be carried out in any field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern 
of everyday life is cut to fit this framework.” Id. at 223. 
148 Weber thus clarifies that as far as bureaucracy is concerned, “the situation is exactly 
the same in the field of public administration and in private bureaucratic organizations, such 
as the large-scale capitalistic enterprise.” Id. at 222. 
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of bureaucracy with complex organization and dysfunction.149 Rather, 
modern workplaces, hospitals, and educational institutions are bureaucratic 
because they exhibit a distinct type of authority and a unique mode of 
interpersonal domination. 
Weber adds the term “office,” a delimited sphere of power that is 
granted to perform professional enterprises, to enhance his discussion of 
bureaucracy. His central idea is that the partition of power into offices 
reflects a systematic division of labor,150 and thus authority is accorded for 
specific purposes.151 Every office thus embodies a multitude of powers and 
prerogatives that, in the normal course of affairs, are used to execute 
professional matters in the service of individuals or organizations. 
Moreover, an office typically means occupying a tangible space, i.e., a 
physical “office” that is distinguishable from the officeholder’s private 
residence.152 The word “office” thus simultaneously connotes a sphere of 
bureaucratic authority—a professional jurisdiction, if you will—and a 
physical space from which an organization or business typically operates. 
The different types of legitimacy underlying traditional and rational 
authority have important implications for the structure of authority. In 
traditional authority, the authority fundamentally belonged to rulers. 
Consequently, its power was holistic and permeated the entire existence of 
both the rulers and the ruled.153 Domination rested upon “personal devotion 
to, and personal authority” of “‘natural’ leaders”154 and the “obligations of 
personal obedience” tended to be “essentially unlimited.”155 Contrary to 
traditional authority, bureaucratic authority is essentially demarcated and 
limited.156 Authority is justified by a rational consideration: the efficient 
 
149 For a discussion of bureaucracy that similarly goes beyond the pejorative 
connotations of complexity and dysfunction, see Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the 
Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442 (1983). 
150 “Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence,” which has been “marked 
off as part of a systematic division of labor.” WEBER, supra note 123, at 218, 220. 
151 Weber notes that each office entails a “rationally delimited jurisdiction” and “sphere 
of obligations” corresponding to the systematic division of labor. Id. at 218.  
152 Weber thus observes the physical separation between “the place in which official 
functions are carried out—the ‘office’ in the sense of the premises” and the private domicile 
of the officeholder. Id. at 219. 
153 Kronman observes that traditional authority is at once religious and economic, and so 
traditional authority structures treat both the sacred and the everyday dimensions of social 
life as essentially continuous. KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 45. 
154 WEBER, supra note 138, at 1117.  
155 Id. at 227. 
156 Weber thus speaks of the authority of office as a “rationally delimited jurisdiction.” 
Id. at 218 (emphasis added). 
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administration of society;157 hence, authority is granted to serve specific—
usually professional—purposes. In modern organizations “the person who 
obeys authority does so, as it is usually stated, only in his capacity as a 
‘member’ of the organization”158 and “there is an obligation to obedience 
only within the sphere of the rationally delimited jurisdiction . . . .”159 
2. Doctors, Employers, and Teachers as Bureaucratic Authority Figures 
Doctors, employers, and teachers exercise bureaucratic authority and 
fulfill offices in the sense described above. Workplace supervisors have 
power, by virtue of their positions, to determine work conditions, whom to 
hire, and whether to promote subordinate employees. Doctors are 
empowered, by virtue of their positions, to prescribe medicine and perform 
medical procedures on a patient. Teachers and university professors have, 
by virtue of their positions, the power to issue grades and to allocate 
scholarships. SAR prohibitions thus engage professionals holding 
bureaucratic positions of power. Feminists and feminist-inspired 
scholarship, whose main interests lie with gender inequality and social 
gender categories, have overlooked this important point. 
Weber’s analysis of bureaucratic authority reminds us that doctors, 
employers, and teachers hold positions of authority under modern 
bureaucracies. Legal texts addressing SAR have often mentioned these 
powers and spoken of the positions of employers, doctors, and teachers as 
positions of power.160 Contemporary legal texts suggest that these powers 
offer a means to extort sex161 and occasionally understand SAR under a 
paradigm of explicit or implicit extortion. In what follows, I suggest that 
 
157 Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative 
organization—that is, the monocratic variety of bureaucracy—is, from a purely technical point of 
view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency . . . . It is superior to any other form in 
precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability . . . . It is finally 
superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is formally capable of 
application to all kinds of administrative tasks. 
. . .  
[T]he needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable.  
Id. at 223. 
158 Id. at 217. 
159 Id. at 218. 
160 See, e.g., CrimA 9256/04 Yosef Noy v. State of Israel IsrSC 60(2) 172, 184 (Isr.) 
(while adjudicating a SAR criminal case, the Israeli Supreme Court observed that “[in 
criminalizing SAR] the legislature sought to prevent those who hold positions of power and 
authority over other people—be them workplace supervisors, army commanders, therapists, 
or others who hold positions of authority—from abusing their position of authority . . .”). 
161 See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 234 (“The doctor may abuse his power, for 
example by threatening to withhold drugs the patient badly needs.”).  
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SAR is concerned not with these powers but with a charismatic abuse of the 
powers of office. 
3. Separate Spheres: The Bureaucratic Sphere and the Personal Sphere 
A consequent implication of rationalization of authority in modern 
times is the demarcation of authority to one sphere and the separation 
between the sphere of authority and “private life.”162 While historically 
there was an “undifferentiated continuity” between official and private life, 
modernity requires a sharp division between the two domains.163 In modern 
times, there is a primary separation between the bureaucratic sphere, the 
sphere of authority, and the private sphere, in which hierarchy and 
domination are undesirable. People who are authority figures in their 
professional lives—i.e., in the clinic or in the office—are not supposed to 
have power or authority over others in their private lives. In the privacy of 
their own lives (say, when they meet friends), they are equal—or are 
supposed to be equal—to everyone else. This reality of separate spheres, 
and the difficulty individuals have adopting its artificial circumstances, is 
the heart of the problem to which SAR regulation responds. SAR 
regulations assume that sexual relations should fall into the private—not the 
bureaucratic—sphere, and thus that they should not carry authority or 
power from the bureaucratic sphere.164 
C. WHAT IS SEXUAL ABUSE IN AUTHORITY RELATIONS? 
We have reached the stage to answer the puzzle of SAR offenses: 
namely, what motivates the criminalization and adjudication of sex within 
authority relations? The basic SAR scenario is a sexual encounter within the 
context of a professional relationship. Yet what is wrong with this 
combination? While an amorous relationship could interfere with the proper 
professional functioning of those involved and is not a new quandary,165 it 
 
162 I mean “private life” here in the everyday sense of the word: life when one is by 
herself or with family or friends, and is not engaged in professional activities. 
163 KRONMAN, supra note 124, at 47. 
164 The concept of spheres and its application in the field of social and legal policy are 
not new. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1983) (conceptualizing society as comprised of several distinct spheres of 
activity, such as money and commodity, office, and political power, and advocating an ideal 
of complex equality, by which power from one sphere should be restrained from dominating 
other spheres). The specific use of bureaucratic sphere, its application to SAR, and the 
assertions regarding desired equality in these situations are mine.  
165 Professional codes of conduct have long proscribed sex between doctors and patients 
as professional misconduct: “The ban on physician–patient sexual contact is based on the 
recognition that such contact jeopardizes patients’ medical care.” Council on Ethical and 
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is not the crux of SAR offenses. These offenses, unlike professional rules of 
conduct, are not concerned with the influence of sex on professional 
treatment, but rather the influence of professional relationships on intimate 
relationships. SAR offenses are concerned with individuals and their abuse 
by professional authority figures. Our mission is to explain why and how. 
At the heart of SAR criminalization is a novel type of power: one 
derived from the office that extends into personal matters—where it has no 
place being. I term this new power charisma of the office. Legislators and 
courts are, even if they lack the proper language to realize it themselves, 
trying to limit this new power, making sure the powers vested in a 
bureaucratic office do not overstep the office’s bounds and influence 
subordinates’ private lives. The following subsections expand and clarify 
these concepts and show their power in analyzing SAR offenses and cases. 
1. Revisiting the Tayeb Case 
I return to Tayeb, the Israeli Supreme Court case involving a patient 
and her physical therapist.166 Evident in the case is the therapist’s power 
over the patient, but the nature of the power is unclear. Even if the Court’s 
attempts to verbalize this power were lacking, it is evident that the Court 
found that Tayeb had power over the patient and that the sexual act was 
wrongful. Without finding the correct language, the Court resorted to the 
complainant’s testimony: 
I just submitted to every word he said. I thought, well if ever I was in a situation like 
that, I would know what to do, but I was like I came under his authority, I came under 
his submission. I didn’t fight, I just did what he said. 
. . . .  
[H]is voice was very authoritative and strong, and I just came under what he had to 
say. 
. . . .  
Like if you say to a little child, ‘do this’, they do that, that is exactly how I was.167 
Interestingly, the complainant’s attempt to explain what happened to 
her reflects the very same embarrassment that informs the entire legal field: 
how to explain sexual submission in the absence of true desire on the one 
hand and the absence of overt coercion on the other hand. But while the 
 
Judicial Affairs, Sexual Misconduct in the Practice of Medicine, CJA Report A—I-90 Am. 
Med. Ass’n 1 (1990).  
166 CrimA 115/00 Morris Tayeb v. State of Israel 54(3) PD 289 [2000] (Isr.). 
167 The complainant, a tourist from Australia, gave her testimony in English and 
appeared as is in the Court’s protocol. Id. at 315 (citations omitted). 
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complainant is disappointed by her own passivity (“I didn’t fight”), her 
testimony implies something other than mere helplessness. It indicates, 
rather, a submission to authority (“I came under his authority”). I contend 
that the underlying assumption of the Court’s judgment is that Tayeb 
possessed, as part of his professional status, a power to make patients 
follow his orders and that the complainant’s sexual submission took place 
as part of this habituation. The Court concluded that the complainant’s 
submission to her therapist did not reflect “free choice.”168 I argue that this 
conclusion reflects a fundamental perception of the complainant’s 
submission as subservient compliance within an authority relation. 
Attentive now to the insights drawn from social theory of authority, we 
can better understand the Court’s intuition and why the Court considered 
the complainant’s behavior compliance. The categorization of doctor–
patient relations as authority relations makes sense to anyone who has been 
party to such relations and has experienced their hierarchical nature. Using 
Arendt’s vocabulary, such relations involve a hierarchy between “the one 
who commands and the one who obeys.”169 Such a hierarchy was embedded 
in the relationship between Tayeb and his patient. It is the fundamental 
parameter underlying our “gut feeling” that Tayeb was more powerful than 
the complainant and that sex between the parties was wrongful. 
2. Charisma of the Office 
Hierarchy in itself, or the power embedded in it, is not what concerns 
us in Tayeb. Doctor–patient relationships are based precisely on the 
authority of the doctor, due to his or her professional knowledge and skills. 
This hierarchy is there because we intend it to be. Patients routinely rely on 
it when they follow a doctor’s prescription or listen to his advice, 
“surrendering” their own judgment to that of a professional. The problem in 
Tayeb and similar situations is that the doctor extended the power that was 
originally granted for professional purposes to a strictly non-professional 
domain. This extension or overstepping is what the Court considered to be 
wrong and abusive toward the patient–complainant. I term this extended 
influence charisma of the office.170 
Tayeb relied on the kind of influence that is typical of authority 
relations, which works neither through force nor through coercion. This 
type of influence makes people follow the guidance and direction of a 
 
168 Id. at 306. 
169 ARENDT, supra note 126, at 93. 
170 This expression is borrowed from Weber, although I attach a different meaning to it 
and employ it in a different context, to serve my own purpose in interpreting SAR offenses. 
For Weber’s concept of charisma of the office, see WEBER, supra note 123, at 248. 
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person of authority with no external means of coercion. Normally, this type 
of domination is available to people by virtue of their professional status 
and is used—and is expected to be used—only within their professional 
domain and only for professional purposes. Tayeb, however, extended it to 
sex. The complainant’s submission was due to a residue, extension, or halo 
of the credited influence of the authority that Tayeb possessed as a 
therapist. I chose the term charisma because of the subtle and hard-to-
define nature of this influence. A “halo” or “residue” is much closer to the 
aura of charisma than it is to a physical power. 
Yet charisma usually signifies a positive attribute—a gift that some 
have that allows them to lead and inspire others. Like personal charisma, 
charisma of the office leads people into action. Unlike personal charisma, 
however, charisma of the office is not due to a charming or extraordinary 
personality, but rather originates from a professional position of power. It 
is, in fact, an extension of the authority that was originally accorded as part 
of their professional position—as part of their office—that continues even 
outside the professional domain. It is thus a charisma deriving from an 
office. I argue that Tayeb was punished for using charisma of the office to 
induce sexual submission. This conception of wrongdoing underlies 
additional SAR cases and designates SAR as a legal category. 
In sum, Tayeb extended and misused his power as an authority figure. 
Tayeb, like any therapist, had physical access and proximity to the 
complainant on the treatment bed; yet he did not use physical coercion. 
Tayeb, like other therapists, possessed knowledge and expertise vital to the 
complainant’s wellbeing; however, he did not “bargain” his professional 
expertise for sexual favors. Moreover, he did not use fraud. His offense was 
not achieved through lies or misrepresentation—the complainant did not for 
one minute think that sex was part of the therapeutic session. Otherwise, 
she would not have been so deeply puzzled in her later testimony by her 
inability to resist Tayeb and would instead have attributed her submission to 
being mistaken or misinformed. Tayeb did not commit an offense according 
to any traditional category of violation of autonomy. What he did was use 
(or abuse) the charisma of the office—the extended power that he benefited 
from based upon his professional office, which he used wrongfully in an 
arena completely outside of his professional realm. 
3. What Is Wrong with Sex in Authority Relations 
What remains to be explained is why the dynamic of Tayeb is not 
exceptional and why it is endemic to modern society. This pervasive 
behavior has consequently given rise to SAR offenses and ultimately to the 
need for their justification. At first, this type of offense may seem alien to 
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modern bureaucracies. After all, the separation of spheres and the clear 
demarcation of bureaucratic authority is inherent to the logic of modern life. 
However, SAR offenses acknowledge the gap between the Weberian ideal 
of bureaucratic authority and its actualization in real life. Under the 
Weberian ideal, SAR abuse would be impossible: officeholders would 
know and accept the limits of their authority and subordinates would 
ascribe power to officeholders only within the realm of their competencies. 
In everyday life, people may find it difficult to act upon the artificial divide 
between the spheres. The outcome is the charismatic extension of power 
from the bureaucratic sphere to the personal sphere. This charismatic 
extension of power is the heart of the problem to which SAR regulation 
responds. 
The separation between professional and personal is not always 
problematic. The two spheres can lead a parallel existence as long as one 
has professional relationships with some people and private relationships 
with others. The spheres peacefully coexist, each under its own separate 
logic. Fundamentally, this parallel existence is obliterated when two people, 
who adhere to a professional hierarchy within the sphere of office, add sex, 
an intimate activity par excellence, to their relations. As noted in Falah,171 
an Israeli Supreme Court decision dealing with sexual abuse by a 
psychologist, in these instances the distinction between professional 
treatment and personal lovemaking becomes blurred,172 and the parties enter 
the “twilight zone” of therapy interwoven with romance.173 Criminal law 
(through SAR offenses) assumes that whenever sex is initiated between two 
people who, concurrently with their sexual liaison, also have a professional 
association, it may lead to a particular type of exploitation resulting from 
the lack of distinction between professional and private life. The distinction 
between the spheres is not problematic when the parties are clearly in either 
one or the other: when the doctor gives medical advice, the sides are clearly 
in the sphere of office; when doctor and patient meet in the theater, they are 
clearly in the private sphere. The confusing cases are those in the middle, 
especially if sex is initiated by an authority figure in “the office,” the 
physical space designated for professional activity. 
On any strictly rational account, sexual matters are outside the scope 
of authority of teachers, workplace supervisors, or of therapists. On a purely 
informational level, subordinates know this well. Nevertheless, SAR 
offenses assume subordinates may find it difficult or even impossible to 
 
171 CrimA 7024/93 Eli Falah v. State of Israel 49(1) PD 2 [1995]. 
172 Id. at 37. 
173 Id. at 24. 
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maintain the separation between the two spheres. Criminal law assumes 
that, in everyday life, subordinates find it hard to act upon the rational 
assumption that the person standing in front of them asking for sex is 
operating in his capacity as a private person and should be acknowledged as 
their equal rather than an authority figure. Instead, they tend to submit to 
such sexual requests or to feel as if they are not in a position to refuse them. 
At the moment of truth, they tend to perceive the authority figure as 
holistically powerful rather than merely professionally authorized, and 
certain officeholders on their part take advantage of this tendency and 
manipulate subordinates into having unwanted sex. 
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 
SAR offenses acknowledge a distinct wrong: the charismatic 
overstepping of authority from the bureaucratic sphere into the intimate 
sphere. This conceptual analysis has clear normative implications on the 
regulation of SAR offenses. Other conceptualizations of the wrong—e.g., 
liberal and feminist—lead to different, mistaken, regulatory arrangements. 
The following Part proposes a new regulation, based on the 
conceptualization presented above. The following discussion is not a 
comprehensive model for a new regulation but rather an outline of the 
normative implications of this Article’s analysis.  
The most important normative consequence of the new 
conceptualization is recognizing that SAR should be regulated as a new 
type of abuse of authority under a regulatory criminal model and not as a 
sex offense or as a core criminal offense. Consequently, SAR offenses 
should be punished less severely than traditional sex offenses (which are 
core offenses). Secondly, the new conceptualization of SAR allows for a 
more precise definition of the elements of the offense: the actus reus of 
SAR should include abuse of authority and not nonconsent, and the legal 
inquiry should focus on the offender’s misconduct and not on the subjective 
state of mind of the victim. 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TYPE OF REGULATION 
Thus far, criminalization of SAR was justified either through liberal or 
through feminist premises. This has had detrimental consequences on SAR 
regulation. Liberals equate SAR with a breach of sexual autonomy. 
Consequently, they consider SAR offenses as sex offenses and as “true 
crimes,” i.e., analogous to other sex offenses such as rape and sexual 
assault.174 In the event a breach was not proven, SAR offenders were 
 
174 Schulhofer, for example, supports the criminalization of sex within mental therapy 
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altogether exempted from criminal sanctions. The feminist account 
criminalizes SAR offenses as gender exploitation of power. Feminists, like 
liberals, do not distinguish between SAR and other sex offenses and 
consequently advocate for its severe punishment—on the same scale as 
other sex offenses. 
While both liberals and feminists conceive of SAR under the general 
category of sex offenses and take authority relations as a subcategory, SAR 
is better placed under the general category of abuse of authority, with 
sexual relations as a subcategory. Criminal law has traditionally proscribed 
abuse of authority, but the prohibition was limited to the abuse of public 
authority.175 SAR offenses engage a different type of authority—
bureaucratic authority—and seek to prevent its charismatic abuse. Thus 
conceived, SAR should be perceived as an expansion of traditional abuse of 
authority offenses,176 rather than an expansion of sexual assault offenses. 
The most important consequence of the new conceptualization is 
recognizing that SAR offenses should be classified and treated as regulatory 
offenses and not as core criminal offenses. The distinction between core 
offenses and regulatory offenses is central to modern criminal law and 
criminal legal theory.177 Core crimes carry severe criminal punishment 
(typically imprisonment) and require proof of subjective fault (mens rea) by 
the offender. Regulatory offenses are punishable by low levels of 
punishment (typically fines) and satisfied with proof of negligence or an 
even lower mens rea. Two main categories comprise core crimes: violation 
of individual autonomy (e.g., murder and theft) and crimes against public 
 
relationships as “sexual abuse”—a felony of the third degree under a comprehensive code 
for the criminalization of sex offenses. SCHULHOFER, supra note 49, at 283–84. 
175 For a useful introduction of abuse-of-office offenses in criminal law, including 
official oppression, common law extortion, malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance in 
office, see ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 483–92 (2d ed. 1969). For a thorough 
consideration of official extortion offenses under contemporary American law, see James 
Lindgren, The Theory, History, and Practice of the Bribery–Extortion Distinction, 141 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1695 (1993). 
176 In recent decades, there has been a growing tendency to criminalize nongovernmental 
corruption—for example, commercial bribery. For a classic piece on the criminalization of 
nongovernmental corruption, see Note, Control of Nongovernmental Corruption by Criminal 
Legislation, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 848 (1960). For a detailed account of the analogy between 
SAR offenses and traditional abuse-of-office offenses in criminal law, see Schneebaum, 
supra note 18, at 119–37. 
177 For a thorough consideration of the distinction between crimes and regulatory 
offenses, see ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM 169–73 (2009). For a classic piece 
depicting the emergence of regulatory offenses since the nineteenth century, see Francis 
Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933). In particular, the 
article associates the introduction of regulatory offenses with modernization (most notably 
technological development and urbanization). 
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legal authority and order (e.g., treason and bribery).178 SAR falls in neither 
of the two categories, as SAR offenses are neither concerned with personal 
autonomy nor public legal authority, but rather with bureaucratic authority. 
Nevertheless, SAR is a legal wrong that should be criminalized, albeit to a 
lesser extent. 
Regulatory offenses address wrongdoings against the general welfare 
and are a justified instrument to prevent harm to society as a whole, as well 
as to unspecified groups of individuals.179 Legally, these offenses do not 
focus on particular victims and in fact might not have a victim at all. These 
offenses protect less essential public interests and consequently are not 
punished with the same severity as a core offense. The best analogies to 
SAR are other offenses that regulate public or semipublic spaces (such as 
the workplace, the environment, industries, and others). Thus conceived, 
SAR regulates the bureaucratic environment and not the rights of individual 
victims. It seeks to prevent harm to individuals but does not vindicate the 
violation of individual autonomy. It only protects individuals as long as 
they are in a bureaucratic environment and only from the abuse of 
bureaucratic authority. It also attempts to enable the coexistence of personal 
and professional relationships in a bureaucratic environment. Under this 
account, SAR is not concerned with the general protection of socially 
disadvantaged groups from discrimination, but rather with the prevention of 
abuse of authority. SAR, moreover, is distinguishable from professional 
ethics to the extent that the latter protects the integrity of the profession and 
office, independent of any negative effect on individuals. The aim of SAR 
offenses is neither to protect the subordinate as a victim nor the professional 
standard of the officeholder, but rather to protect the space, the 
environment, and the relationship between the two. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DOCTRINE 
In addition to reconsidering the severity of SAR crimes and 
punishment, several other normative and doctrinal consequences follow 
from its new conceptualization. First, the central element of SAR is the 
 
178 See generally ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 29 (6th ed. 2009) 
(distinguishing between crimes against individual autonomy and core crimes against the 
community as a whole). 
179 Brudner thus observes that regulatory offenses punish for acts that do not involve a 
domination of the free will of individual victims. ALAN BRUDNER, THE UNITY OF THE 
COMMON LAW 215 (1995) (“[O]ne may incur penalties for acts that do not dominate the free 
will of others, either because (as in the case of a breach of a safety regulation) they involve 
no transaction with another person or because (as in the case of trafficking in narcotics) the 
transaction is consensual.”). 
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abuse of authority and not the lack of consent. Contrary to liberal accounts 
of SAR offenses, which require proof of the victim’s nonconsent,180 the 
proposed conceptualization assumes victim consent and requires proof of 
the offender’s abuse of authority. 
Secondly, the presence of authority alone is not enough—there needs 
to be an abuse of authority. The mere coexistence of sexual relations and 
authority relations is insufficient to warrant criminal punishment. What we 
are looking for, instead, is to identify and proscribe sexual acts performed 
under the influence of official power and thus in abuse thereof. It is possible 
to think of sexual contact between an officeholder and a subordinate, which 
is not procured through the undue diversion of official power from the 
professional to the private sphere. For example, a dentist who meets a 
patient at a dinner party thrown by a mutual friend and asks her for a date, 
which is later followed by a sexual affair, surely has not committed a 
criminal offense. The distinction between abusive and nonabusive sex in 
these contexts is not easy. Naturally, some cases are more difficult to decide 
than others, but there are clear cases on each end of the spectrum. Abuse of 
authority is, in any case, the guiding concept to distinguish among them and 
to define the limits of criminality. It follows that existing SAR provisions 
that are phrased as per se prohibitions—i.e., that categorically proscribe all 
sex in authority relations without requiring an additional element of 
abuse—may be acknowledged as instances of overcriminalization. 
Following these principles, a new and more precise legal definition of 
the offense can be derived from the new conceptualization. To recall, the 
offense was defined as abuse of authority, and specifically, the abuse of the 
charismatic authority of office. This definition entails the following 
doctrinal elements: 
Authority: The offender holds bureaucratic authority. This definition 
excludes other forms of authority: charismatic authority (e.g., a rock star) as 
well as state authority (e.g., a police officer). It, however, includes 
 
180 In their attempt to interpret SAR provisions, courts have read an element of 
nonconsent into the offense even if the official definition did not include nonconsent. See, 
e.g., Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 1040–41 (Wyo. 1987) (“In the exercise of its 
governmental police power, the legislature has thrown out the protecting arm of the law to 
guard those persons who are vulnerable to the powers and influence of one in a position of 
authority. This legislative act permits the State to show that the victim did not consent, by 
demonstrating that the perpetrator occupied a position of authority over the victim and used 
that position to impose his sexual will.”). I argue that this interpretation is misguided and 
that SAR offenses should not include an element of sexual nonconsent, but rather should 
focus on abuse of authority. 
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professional bureaucrats (e.g., a post office manager) and authority figures 
in other institutional contexts (e.g., a member of the clergy).181 
Authority Relations: The offender is an officeholder who has effective 
authority over the victim within the sphere of bureaucratic competency 
(employer over an employee; doctor over a patient). 
Abuse of Authority: The offender uses his authority to achieve an 
objective that does not belong to the bureaucratic sphere. The paradigmatic 
case of abuse of authority is charismatic abuse of bureaucratic authority. 
Extortionate threats182 and false claims by an officeholder should be 
covered by the offense as clear cases of abuse of authority. They are, 
however, less typical. In addition, extortionate and fraudulent cases 
constitute sexual nonconsent and may be covered by sex offense provisions, 
to the extent that such provisions cover sexual extortion and fraudulent sex. 
To conclude, extortionate threats and false claims are the only SAR cases 
that may be criminalized both as sex offenses and as abuse of bureaucratic 
authority. 
Abuse of Charisma of the Office: An essential component of the 
offense is proving that an authority overstepped the boundaries between the 
bureaucratic and the intimate spheres. A sexual relationship may be one 
paradigm but does not exhaust the range of proscribed conduct. Nonsexual 
intimacy that manipulates the charisma of office may also constitute an 
offense. In adjudicating SAR cases, courts need to assess the extent to 
which the line between the personal and professional sphere is blurred. The 
following elements are not conclusive in determining abuse, but 
considering them would be helpful in deciding the case:  
(1) Where did the sexual encounter take place? An officeholder who 
initiates sexual contact in the physical space of bureaucratic 
authority—the office, the university, the clinic—effectively plays on 
the blurred line between the bureaucratic sphere and the personal 
sphere. Hence, a sexual affair taking place in the office or clinic (or 
initiated in these locations) is more suspect than a sexual encounter 
taking place in a nonoffice location, such as a bar, after working hours.  
 
181 Regulators of SAR offenses have come up with more elaborate and, for the most part, 
satisfying demarcations of bureaucratic authority. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-919(a) 
(2004). 
182 An interesting question arises as to offers as opposed to threats in this context. While 
traditional criminal law standards distinguish between threats and offers and between 
coercion and bargain, an abuse-of-authority model may support the criminalization of offers 
by bureaucratic authority as well. The present Article focuses on charismatic abuse of 
bureaucratic authority, where neither threats nor offers are present. Thus, a full development 
of the argument regarding coercive offers is outside this Article’s scope.  
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(2) Who initiated the sexual act? Since the offense seeks to prevent the 
overstepping of bureaucratic authority, we are mostly concerned with 
cases where the authority figure was the initiating party.  
(3) How active was the authority figure in transferring his professional 
power to the personal sphere? Aggressive or persistent sexual 
requirements presented by an officeholder are more suspect than a 
single offer.183 
CONCLUSION 
More and more jurisdictions have criminalized or are in the process of 
adopting legislation prohibiting SAR. Feminists and liberals alike support 
such prohibitions and share a strong sense that SAR is often wrongful and 
abusive. But while the sense of moral wrong is apparent, its legal 
foundations are uncertain. This Article suggests a new theory and a new 
justification for SAR criminalization, which carries both conceptual and 
normative implications. 
As this Article shows, threats are not the ground for the criminalization 
of SAR offenses. Instead, new statutory definitions use “abuse of authority” 
(rather than extortion); courts employ a “totality of the circumstances” test 
to adjudicate SAR cases; and legal scholarship acknowledges the 
shortcomings of extortion theory for SAR offenses. 
Feminists have been correct to identify the limitations of standard 
liberal theory with respect to SAR offenses. The theory of authority 
relations suggested here, while based on different premises, shares an 
important point with feminist thought and methodology: it looks beyond the 
liberal portrayal of individuals as autonomous actors and incorporates social 
theory in order to account for the social structure in which SAR offenses 
take place. Unlike feminism, however, the suggested theory focuses on 
authority rather than on male power and develops a theory of abuse of 
authority, rather than power domination. 
The concept of abuse of authority is not foreign to criminal law. 
However, the traditional criminalization of authority has been limited in the 
common law tradition to governmental authority and the misconduct of 
public officials. SAR offenses apply to a different type of authority—
bureaucratic authority—that is present in private sphere institutions and 
 
183 Buchhandler-Raphael similarly stresses the persistence of sexual advances by an 
authority figure as an important indication for criminal abuse. See Buchhandler-Raphael, 
supra note 53, at 484. Buchhandler-Raphael, however, considers this parameter as part of an 
abuse-of-power model, which includes economic and professional power, rather than an 
abuse-of-authority model. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 112, at 133. 
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relationships whenever people are granted power by virtue of their 
profession or place in the hierarchy of an organization. 
SAR offenses, as we have seen, identify a new potential for abuse that 
emerges in bureaucratic arenas. While bureaucratic authority is supposed to 
be demarcated and apply to professional matters only, authority figures in 
effect are able to extend their charisma of office to nonprofessional matters. 
SAR statutes are particularly troubled by the overstepping of power from 
the bureaucratic sphere to the personal sphere and criminalize sex in 
authority relations as a novel type of abuse of authority. 
Understood in this way, SAR offenses should not be construed as 
introducing a new conception of legal autonomy. These offenses do not 
modify the legal standard of sexual nonconsent, but rather apply to 
consensual sexual relations that are nevertheless wrongful because the 
offender misuses his position of bureaucratic authority. Criminal law does 
not assume that sex is—or should be—free from any type of social power 
or charisma, hence personal charisma (e.g., the charisma of a rock star 
soliciting a woman into sexual involvement) is not covered by SAR 
offenses. SAR offenses are concerned particularly with the coexistence of 
personal and professional relationships and the overstepping of bureaucratic 
charisma into the sphere of intimacy and sex. 
Modern society faces a new kind of challenge in the age of 
bureaucracy. While we strive for freedom, our ambition cannot be and 
should not be to eliminate bureaucratic domination. While we strive for 
equality in our personal lives, we require hierarchy in our professional lives 
and in our institutions. As Weber explains, bureaucracy offers great 
advantages in terms of efficiency and productivity and is indispensable to 
modern life. This is not to assume that these boundaries are “natural” or 
even easily maintainable. It is precisely their ambiguous nature and 
fluctuating borders that give rise to SAR offenses. Our challenge is to limit 
bureaucratic rule and to prevent the overstepping of boundaries that might 
turn bureaucratic domination into an unacceptable status relationship. This 
Article suggests that SAR offenses are concerned with an instance of this 
challenge. It reflects an understanding of the problem we face not as a 
problem of coercion (as liberals would have it), but of abuse. Not as a 
problem of eliminating power relations (as some feminists would have it), 
but rather one of restraining power and keeping it within limits. 
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